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Picking Up the Slackline: Can the United States and Japan 
Successfully Regulate Commercial Fishing of Bluefin Tuna 
Following Failed Intergovernmental Attempts? 
 
SARAH E. BAUER* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Bluefin tuna is widely regarded as one of the most highly evolved sea species on 
the planet.1 Nicknamed the “Porsche of the Ocean,” Bluefin tuna can be roughly 
the same size, and match the same speeds, as a sports car.2 Historically, they have 
reached a somewhat mythological status for this size and speed—the Romans 
included depictions of Bluefin on their currency,3 Carl Linnaeus named it the “tuna 
of tunas” upon classifying the species for the first time, and Ernest Hemingway 
once called it “the king of all fish.”4  
Bluefin tuna5 were once abundant in the western Atlantic and Mediterranean, 
but in recent years, Bluefin stocks have been depleted worldwide.6 This is largely 
due to the fact that the Bluefin is not only as big and as fast as a Porsche—it is also 
just as valuable. Since sushi became a worldwide phenomenon and the demand for 
Bluefin meat skyrocketed, a medium-sized Bluefin tuna can sell for $10,000 to 
$20,0007 in certain markets, with bigger fish going for as much as $150,000 each.8 
As a result, it is one of the most aggressively overfished species in the oceans. As 
of 2009, the number of Bluefin tuna left in the western Atlantic was down 82 
percent from its levels in the 1960s,9 while populations of Pacific Bluefin dropped 
                                                                                                             
 
* J.D. 2016, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. My gratitude to Nick Roberts and 
Chelsea Stanley for their careful edits; thanks also to Professors Robert Fischman and Joseph 
Hoffmann for their helpful feedback and to Mr. Kevin Kubacki for his unparalleled writing 
instruction. I dedicate this Note to Charlie Beeker and his team at the Indiana University Office 
of Underwater Science for their tireless ocean conservation efforts—and to my parents, for 
supporting my oceanic exploration dreams in a landlocked state. 
1 See, e.g., SUSHI: THE GLOBAL CATCH (Sakana Film Productions 2012) (statement of 
Mike Sutton, head of the Center for the Future of the Oceans). 
2 Id.  
3 Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Backs International Trade Ban on Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/03/ 
AR2010030301436.html [https://perma.cc/R8DF-SG27]. 
4 Kenneth Brower, Quicksilver, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 2014, available at http://ngm. 
nationalgeographic.com/2014/03/bluefin-tuna/brower-text [https://perma.cc/LYH4-D28U]. 
5 “Bluefin tuna” is used generally to refer to multiple species of the same genus; for the 
purposes of this Note, “Bluefin” indicates either the Atlantic or Pacific Bluefin. 
6 See, e.g., id.; infra text accompanying notes 9–12. 
7 See Brower, supra note 4 (noting that while extremely high Bluefin prices can 
sometimes be attributed to traditional Japanese bidding wars on markets’ opening days, the 
average price for medium-sized fish is relatively stable). 
8 Patrick Reis, U.S. Backs Proposed Trading Ban on Bluefin Tuna, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/03/03/03greenwire-us-backs-proposed-trading-
ban-on-bluefin-tuna-74803.html [https://perma.cc/M78L-E7QT].  
9 Barry Estabrook, The Last of the Bluefin Tuna?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2009/11/the-last-of-the-bluefin-tuna/30112/ 
[https://perma.cc/NLJ3-EPMC] (discussing international failures to protect Bluefin stock). 
106 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT [Vol. 91:88 
 
by approximately 96 percent.10 Some estimates say there are now only 9000 total 
Bluefin left in North America’s stock.11 Perhaps more distressingly, 90 percent of the 
Bluefin on the market last year were juveniles that had not yet reproduced.12 The Pew 
Environmental Group has long called for a suspension in the commercial fishing of 
the species to allow it time to recover, though there is some concern that it is too late 
for such measures.13 The Pacific Bluefin was added to the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature red list of threatened species in November of 2014.14  
Since the 1960s, international organizations have attempted to protect Bluefin 
from overfishing.15 For various reasons, however, these attempts at 
intergovernmental regulation have failed spectacularly, leading environmental 
groups to call on individual nations to take up the mantle.16 Due to their joint status 
as the world’s largest consumers of Bluefin tuna,17 the United States and Japan are 
potentially the two nations most able to save the species from extinction. To 
determine whether these countries can implement effective regulations to make up 
for a lack of intergovernmental success, however, multiple elements must be 
considered. First, the very nature of the respective countries’ markets and the 
regulatory bodies they have in place are factors in determining whether these 
countries are candidates for successful governmental regulation. Second, their 
governments’ historical stances on commercial fishing regulation, both for the 
Bluefin and for other species, are perhaps the best marker for whether proper 
regulation, enforcement, and compliance can be expected from the nations called 
on to prevent Bluefin overfishing.  
Part I of this Note will address the reasons why intergovernmental organizations 
have failed to adequately regulate the commercial fishing of Bluefin tuna. Part II 
offers an analysis of the Bluefin markets in the United States and Japan and argues 
that these countries are ideal candidates for successful Bluefin regulation because 
of their market structures. Part III explores the likelihood that the two countries 
would implement such regulations, taking into account the respective governments’ 
histories of species-specific regulation.  
 
  
                                                                                                             
 
10 Louise Gray, Days After Bluefin Tuna Sells for £1m Conservationists Warn Species Is 
Dying Out, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/earthnews/ 
9790478/Days-after-bluefin-tuna-sells-for-1m-conservationists-warn-species-is-dying-
out.html [https://perma.cc/6NBQ-ZVGT].  
11 Paul Greenberg, Tuna’s End, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 22, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/06/27/magazine/27Tuna-t.html [https://perma.cc/5VF6-8RMR].  
12 Gray, supra note 10.  
13 Greenburg, supra note 11.  
14 Adam Vaughan & Eric Hilaire, Red List: The World’s Most Threatened Species – 
Interactive, GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-
interactive/2014/nov/17/red-list-the-worlds-most-threatened-species-interactive 
[https://perma.cc/4JE8-T27T]. Pacific Bluefin had previously been categorized as fish of 
“least concern.” Id. The change in status indicates that the species is now threatened with 
extinction. Id.  
15 Estabrook, supra note 9.  
16 See infra Part I.  
17 Greenberg, supra note 11.  
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I. THE FAILURE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Maritime law concerning fishing in the high seas was originally based on 
principles laid out in Hugo Grotius’s 1609 treatise “Mare Liberum,” which 
essentially recommended free use of oceans by all.18 Such free use has clearly 
become untenable as various species are overfished to the threat of extinction.19 
Instead, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) now 
defines the rights and responsibilities of various nations with respect to their ability 
to use the oceans.20 One regulation prescribed by UNCLOS is the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ). EEZs stretch for two hundred nautical miles out from a 
country’s coastline, and while they do confer special rights, they do not confer full 
sovereignty.21 Most Bluefin are fished in EEZs, and the clash between the “special 
rights” of the territorial country and the rights of others to fish in such areas gave 
rise to various multinational agreements.22 Even when Bluefin are in one nation’s 
territorial waters, they generally remain under the “foggy international jurisdiction” 
of certain tuna treaties.23  
In the last forty years, the high seas have largely been regulated by eighteen 
regional fisheries-management organizations.24 These organizations are 
“consensus-oriented,” where politics reign and poor quotas are set in order to 
finalize any type of deal.25 Member countries have equal status and voting rights, 
despite widely varying interests in the regions’ fishing trade.26 Quotas are the most 
popular form of regulation to come out of these intergovernmental bodies, and they 
are generally unreliable because of rampant illegal fishing and the unwillingness of 
consuming nations to track trade accurately.27  
Recently, the U.N. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES), the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Commission (IATTC) have convened to discuss the overfishing of Bluefin 
tuna. The IATTC has been generally ineffective, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in Japan amounted to little more than “words . . . not translated into 
action,”28 and CITES simply delegated its authority to the International 
                                                                                                             
 
18 Id. (discussing the reasons for creating intergovernmental regulatory bodies). 
19 Gaia Vince, How the World’s Oceans Could Be Running Out of Fish, BBC (Sep. 21, 
2012), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120920-are-we-running-out-of-fish 
[https://perma.cc/2MJJ-YQYH]. 
20 Id. 
21 Only territorial waters confer full sovereignty; EEZs instead allow “special rights” that are 
limited to areas below the surface of the sea. Surface waters are still considered international 
waters. See generally Greenberg, supra note 11; United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
22 Greenberg, supra note 11.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 37–43.  
28 Oliver Knowles, ICCAT Fails to Protect Bluefin Tuna, GREENPEACE INT’L (Nov. 27, 
2010), http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/iccat-fails-to-
protect-bluefin-tuna/blog/29151/ [https://perma.cc/9WKP-FFEU]. Mr. Knowles is an oceans 
campaigner with Greenpeace International and has led Greenpeace’s ICCAT delegation. Id.  
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Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT).29  
ICCAT is the best known, and most widely criticized, of the Bluefin 
intergovernmental bodies; it is commonly referred to derogatorily as the 
“International Conspiracy to Catch All Tuna.”30 It was formed in 1969 and has 
forty-eight member countries that agree on international regulations for Atlantic 
Bluefin.31 Those countries typically meet once a year to set quotas on the number 
of Bluefin allowed to be fished worldwide and distribute those quotas among 
themselves.32 The quotas, however, are the source of much of ICCAT’s criticism.33 
In 2008, ICCAT’s own scientists recommended a 15,000 metric ton catch limit on 
Bluefin.34 Member countries instead voted to set the number at 23,000 metric 
tons.35 Despite heavy backlash from environmental groups, this practice has 
become commonplace; ICCAT again failed to follow the recommendations of its 
own scientists in 2010, when it agreed to reduce the catch limit by only 600 tons 
for the following year.36  
High quotas would not be such a problem for the Atlantic Bluefin if they were 
implemented properly, but ICCAT has notoriously poor enforcement standards. Dr. 
Susan Lieberman of the Pew Environmental Group has stated that the amount of 
Atlantic Bluefin caught yearly is likely twice as high as the agreed amount because 
ICCAT has failed to ensure that member countries comply.37 Some ICCAT 
members simply do not report their catch amounts, and 80 percent of ICCAT’s 
records are missing the information used to determine which fish are legally or 
illegally caught.38 Very few patrol boats or inspectors police the countries, and 
many member nations are cash-strapped and do not have the means to enforce the 
regulations they agree to.39 In the Mediterranean especially, fishermen flout rules 
forbidding the use of spotter planes to identify tuna shoals,40 and some boats have 
been accused of having ties to the Italian mafia.41 ICCAT rules also state that the 
larger vessels must have an “independent observer” onboard, but this directive is 
                                                                                                             
 
29 Id.  
30 This pejorative appears to be widely used among environmental activists, although the 
origins of the phrase are unclear. See, e.g., GLOBAL CATCH, supra note 1 (quoting sustainable 
sushi restaurateur Casson Trenor); Brower, supra note 4; Estabrook, supra note 9 (quoting 
Carl Safina of the Blue Ocean Institute).  
31 SUSHI: THE GLOBAL CATCH, supra note 1. 
32 Id.  
33 See, e.g., id.; Brower, supra note 4 (discussing a report from ICCAT’s own scientists 
that is highly critical of the agreed-on catch quotas).  
34 Estabrook, supra note 9.  
35 Id.  
36 Timothy Hurst, Bluefin Tuna Get No Help from International Community, 
ECOPOLITOLOGY (Nov. 27, 2010), http://ecopolitology.org/2010/11/27/bluefin-tuna-gets-no-
help-from-international-community/ [https://perma.cc/F7YA-MAKK]. 
37 Dr. Lieberman first asserted that Bluefin catches are likely twice as high as the set 
quotas while in attendance at the 2009 ICCAT session. Estabrook, supra note 9. She has 
since called for total suspension of Bluefin fishing. Id.  
38 SUSHI: THE GLOBAL CATCH, supra note 1. 
39 Id. 
40 Greenberg, supra note 11. 
41 Michael McCarthy, Is This the End of the Bluefin Tuna?, THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 28, 
2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/is-this-the-end-of-the-bluefin-
tuna-1040246.html [https://perma.cc/2UW7-S4NW]. 
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largely ignored.42 The vessels, which have a capacity for much larger catches than 
their governments have agreed to, often over-catch and under-report.43  
After the backlash from the high catch limit set in 2008, ICCAT members voted 
to begin a system of paper-based catch records that would help cut down on 
Bluefin illegally entering the market by tracing fish to their final destinations.44 Six 
years later, the gap between reported and total catches has only widened.45 An 
investigation into trade data including European Union nation exports, Japanese 
customs documents, and U.S. Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural 
Service records revealed that 140 percent more fish are entering the market than are 
being reported.46 
Also in 2008, ICCAT commissioned an independent review of its policies. The 
review called ICCAT’s stewardship an “international disgrace” and a “travesty of 
fisheries management.”47 Following this dismal feedback, ICCAT researchers 
reported that the Atlantic Bluefin merited inclusion on the U.N. CITES list of 
international trade bans.48 Had CITES voted to include the Bluefin, it would have 
fallen under the jurisdiction of the same body responsible for the protection of 
critically endangered species like tigers, white rhinos, and giant pandas.49 Instead, 
the vote failed at the United Nations, and CITES members delegated their authority 
on the matter back to ICCAT.50  
Despite its many failings, ICCAT has recently made more attempts to protect 
the Bluefin. It has refused to grant amnesty to countries that have fished beyond 
their allotted amounts; instead, ICCAT enacted a policy to slash offenders’ future 
allotments.51 In 2011, it began to test a system that could electronically track 
                                                                                                             
 
42 Richard Black, Med Bluefin Tuna Catch ‘Unabated,’ BBC (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15323370 [https://perma.cc/4K6X-
WRAX]. ICCAT appears to employ a third-party organization that provides Observers for 
transshipment vessels in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans; the Observers are responsible for 
monitoring longliners in ICCAT regions and checking vessel monitoring systems. See 
“ICCAT Regional Observer Programme Manual,” INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE 
CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC TUNA, Nov. 2012, at 23, available at https://www.iccat.int/ 
Documents/ROP/ICCAT_Observer_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4GP-MJZH]. 
43 Black, supra note 42. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Brower, supra note 4. 
48 Estabrook, supra note 9.  
49 CITES has been relatively successful at establishing regulations to protect these other 
critically endangered species. Failure to move Bluefin under its jurisdiction was generally 
considered a serious blow to conservationists. Greenberg, supra note 11. 
50 Id. Of the 129 CITES member countries, seventy-two voted against the ban, forty-three 
voted in favor, and fourteen abstained. David Adam, Bluefin Fails to Make UN’s List of 
Protected Fish, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2010/mar/18/bluefin-tuna-un-cites [https://perma.cc/XW86-NTAZ]. Only the United States, 
Kenya, and Norway supported the ban outright. Id. It was reported that the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, and several other European countries voted in favor of the ban, against the 
European Union’s official position. Id. Japan led the opposition, stating that it is concerned 
about recovery, but ICCAT should be responsible for all Bluefin regulation. Id.  
51 Bleak Future for Bluefin as Tuna Commission Only Marginally Trims Catches, WWF 
GLOBAL (Nov. 27, 2010), http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?197332/Tuna-Commission-fails-
again-to-ensure-bluefin-tuna-recovery#.VzR0QQj6kN0 [https://perma.cc/25M4-UZ6M].  
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caught fish from ocean to market, and it plans to revise its antiquated stock-
assessment protocols in 2015.52 ICCAT’s structure and governance, however, 
remain unchanged, and in November of 2014, quotas were raised from 1750 tons in 
2014 to 2000 tons in 2015 and 2016.53  
It seems natural, then, to call on individual nations to protect Bluefin stocks. 
Multinational bodies have shown a tendency to sacrifice quality decisions in favor 
of simply brokering an agreement among nations with competing interests,54 and 
accusations of vote-buying and political pressure among members are common.55 
The organizations themselves have passed the buck back and forth, and even when 
reasonable regulations are passed, the organizations lack the legal means to enforce 
them.56 They are, essentially, at the mercy of member countries that often cannot or 
will not ensure compliance back home. There is a total lack of individual 
accountability; except for the most egregious violations, failures are mostly 
attributed to the governing body as a whole.57  
The United States and Japan are the obvious candidates for countries that could 
prove to be more effective at protecting the Bluefin. Eighty percent of the world’s 
Bluefin tuna passes through Japanese markets, and both commercial fishing and 
demand for the species have increased massively since the beginning of America’s 
sushi boom.58 Whether these countries can fill in where multinational bodies, 
especially ICCAT, have failed is a question to be answered in the coming years.  
 
II. MARKETS AND REGULATORY BODIES 
 
Both the United States and Japan have the mechanisms in place to be able to 
enforce stricter regulations on commercial Bluefin fishing and trade, especially in 
the area of importation. The makeup of their relative markets also suggests that 
properly enforced restrictions could be quite successful.  
 
A. U.S. Regulations and Ability to Enforce 
 
The U.S. government has made a concerted effort in recent years to regulate 
                                                                                                             
 
52 Brower, supra note 4. ICCAT’s Working Group on Stock Assessment Methods met 
from February 15–19, 2016, to discuss progress on Harvest Control Rules and how to 
increase involvement with the Strategic Initiative on Stock Assessment Methods. See ICCAT 
Circular #8526/2015, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC 
TUNAS, Dec. 2015, available at https://www.iccat.int/Documents/8526-15_ENG.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/K26U-GWVW]. 
53 Bluefin Tuna Catch Limits Increased to 2,000 Tonnes for 2015, CBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 
2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/bluefin-tuna-catch-limits-increased-to-2-
000-tonnes-for-2015-1.2837862 [https://perma.cc/MGE7-HTXP]. 
54 See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text. 
55 Cf. infra notes 154–156 (discussing Japan’s history of buying votes from Caribbean 
nations in the International Whaling Commission, a similar widely criticized 
intergovernmental marine regulatory body).  
56 See generally supra notes 37–43, 47–50 and accompanying text.  
57 The fact that ICCAT has been a lightning rod for criticism in the last few years 
indicates that the larger organization is a convenient scapegoat for members’ failings. 
Despite some nations contributing far more to overfishing than others, equal blame is 
distributed through the governing body. See Greenberg, supra note 11. 
58 Id.  
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commercial fishing of Bluefin tuna. Atlantic Highly Migratory Species fisheries are 
managed under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act and the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act.59 Under the Magnuson-
Stevens Act, the National Marine Fisheries Service (a branch of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration colloquially referred to as “NOAA 
Fisheries”) must manage fisheries to maintain continually optimum yield while 
preventing overfishing.60 The Atlantic Tunas Convention Act was passed 
specifically to ensure that sufficient means of regulation are in place to satisfy 
ICCAT agreements by giving the Secretary of Commerce power to “promulgate 
regulations necessary and appropriate to carry out ICCAT recommendations.”61 
The Secretary of Commerce has since delegated that authority to NOAA’s 
Assistant Administrator for Fisheries.62  
NOAA Fisheries has historically been successful at enforcing regulations and 
achieving its stated goals.63 In August of 2014, NOAA published new requirements 
in a large amendment to its Bluefin management plan.64 These regulations stem 
from a broader goal of meeting the catch quotas allotted to the United States by 
ICCAT while restricting the time, place, and manner in which U.S. fisheries can 
harvest that quota.65 Commercial fleets in the Gulf of Mexico can no longer target 
the species, and while they can still harvest other types of fish in the Gulf, their 
allotted amount of Bluefin bycatch—accidental killings of the fish when it is not 
being targeted—will be lowered.66 Dead discards are accounted for in nations’ 
Bluefin allotments, and NOAA Fisheries has a stated goal of reducing the number 
of dead Bluefin discards.67 Furthermore, video cameras must be installed on fishing 
vessels in the Gulf and parts of the Atlantic coast to record full-time what is being 
caught in an attempt to crack down on illicit fishing activity.68 These regulations 
have been widely applauded and faced relatively little resistance from commercial 
fishing vessels.69 Pew Charitable Trust’s ocean conservation unit recently praised 
NOAA Fisheries for independently increasing Bluefin protections.70  
                                                                                                             
 
59 Final Amendment 7 to the 2006 Consolidated Atlantic Highly Migratory Species 
Fishery Management Plan, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, Aug. 2014, available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/hms/documents/fmp/am7/final_amendment_7_to_the_2006_
consolidated_atlantic_highly_migratory_species_fishery_management_plan_8_28_2014_for
_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LZJ-UZ9D] [hereinafter Final Amendment 7]. 
60 See Final Amendment 7, supra note 59, at v.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 See infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.  
64 See generally Final Amendment 7, supra note 59.  
65 Id. at v.  
66 Id. at v–vi. 
67 Id. 
68 See id at 331. The requirement that commercial vessels in the Atlantic Tuna Longline 
category have electronic monitoring systems onboard was effective June 1, 2015. See NOAA 
Fisheries Announces Dates and Locations for Installation of Electronic Monitoring Systems, 
NOAA FISHERIES, Dec. 2014, available at http://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/sfa/hms/news/ 
news_list/2014/12/a7_em_install_schdule_122314.html [https://perma.cc/4M3C-CL72]. NMFS 
provided funds to pay for the equipment for certain vessels specified in Amendment 7. Id.  
69 See generally infra Part III.A. 
70 “NOAA Fisheries deserves great praise for significantly increasing protections for 
bluefin….This historic action will help western Atlantic bluefin tuna rebuild to healthy 
levels.” Banner Day for Bluefin, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, Aug. 29, 2014, available at 
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NOAA has its own Office of Law Enforcement, a federal police entity 
responsible for enforcing domestic laws and international treaty requirements. It is 
the sole federal agency tasked with enforcing NOAA regulations.71 While the 
effects of the recent expansion of Bluefin protections in the Gulf of Mexico have 
yet to be seen, regulations have been successful at decreasing Pacific Bluefin 
catches.72 Recreational fishermen have had “spectacular” Bluefin fishing off the 
coast of California in the last two years, indicating that those waters were 
maintained properly after NOAA enforced protections.73 The Pacific Bluefin 
fishery in the United States is one of the only fisheries in the world where 
recreational catch sometimes exceeds commercial take; it seems that U.S. 
commercial fisheries are in compliance with federal regulations, and NOAA is 
enforcing its policies properly.74 
 
B. Suggested Improvements and Potential for Success in the United States 
 
In some areas, however, the United States certainly could stand to improve its 
Bluefin protections. Since commercial Bluefin fishing took off in the last twenty 
years or so, NOAA has failed to keep up with some aspects of overfishing. The 
response to the 2010 BP oil spill was extremely slow; it took four years from the 
time of the spill before NOAA passed any regulations on fishing Bluefin in the 
Gulf, despite the knowledge that the spill heavily damaged Bluefin spawning 
grounds.75  
Furthermore, while NOAA has stated that it wishes to reduce Bluefin bycatch, it 
has failed to place harsh regulations on longline fishing—one of the biggest 
contributors to bycatch in general.76 Longlining involves casting a main line on the 
surface or bottom of the water and placing baited hooks along it at certain intervals. 
The main lines can be up to thirty miles long and contain thousands of hooks, often 
resulting in bycatch.77 Many Bluefin become bycatch while fishing vessels longline 
for Yellowfin, and by local law they are supposed to be returned to the sea.78 
American fisheries tend to follow the regulation, but the Bluefin are often dead by 
                                                                                                             
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2014/08/29/banner-day-for-
bluefin [https://perma.cc/G46E-25WN] (statement of Lee Crockett, director of U.S. ocean 
conservation for The Pew Charitable Trusts). 
71 What We Do, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/about/what_we_do.html [https://perma.cc/795Z-BE3P].  
72 Jim Hendricks, Feds To Decide on Tighter Limits for Sport-Caught Bluefin Tuna, 
SPORT FISHING MAGAZINE, Nov. 11, 2014, available at http://www.sportfishingmag.com/ 
blogs/pacific-currents/feds-decide-tighter-limits-sport-caught-pacific-bluefin-tuna 
[https://perma.cc/E2NQ-P394]. 
73 Id. (discussing the necessity of additional regulation after a season of above-average 
fishing indicated some amount of recovery for the species).  
74 Id. For an example of proper enforcement of Amendment 7, see NOAA Fisheries 
Announces the Application of the Individual Bluefin Quota Accounting Rules in the 
Northeast Distant Area, NOAA FISHERIES (Nov. 2015), http://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/sfa/ 
hms/news/news_list/2015/11/111215_ned_ibq-use.htm [https://perma.cc/6FZA-R3WT] 
(announcing that 25-metric-ton bycatch quota for Atlantic Bluefin had been met in the 
Northeast Distant Area and requiring vessels in said area to implement Individual Bluefin 
Quota program).  
75 Greenberg, supra note 11. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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the time they can be discovered and returned.79  
It should be noted that despite the upswing in commercial fishing of Atlantic 
Bluefin, Pacific Bluefin—imported from Japanese markets—are actually more 
commonly served in American restaurants.80 Even though commercial fishing has 
increased in the United States, it is still relatively small, and American fisheries do 
not tend to catch more than their quotas.81 While America’s commercial fishing 
certainly needs to be regulated, the country contributes far more to the worldwide 
Bluefin crisis by increasing demand for the meat and importing from other poorly 
regulated countries. Most American regulations, though, have to do with the act of 
fishing itself and do not focus on importing only legally fished Bluefin.82  
The U.S. government, and NOAA specifically, already have the mechanisms in 
place to fill in the gaps in their policies. Artisanal fishing is one possible answer to 
the problem of longlining. Methods such as harpooning and fish-and-reel result in 
little to no bycatch, and NOAA could potentially offer subsidies to encourage such 
techniques. In addition, regulations limiting longlines to a certain number of hooks 
for Bluefin fishing vessels could reduce bycatch. The NOAA Office of Law 
Enforcement almost certainly has the capacity to enforce such a regulation, 
especially on the heels of the recently passed onboard video requirement.83  
It is also likely that the United States has the capabilities to solve the 
importation problem. In the documentary Jiro Dreams of Sushi, world-famous 
sushi chef Jiro Ono suggests allowing only tuna of a certain size to be caught and 
sold.84 This suggestion has been echoed by environmental groups, as it would 
ensure that juveniles who have not had a chance to reproduce can remain in the 
wild and would likely help stocks recover.85 As a nation that largely imports, the 
United States could potentially place a ban on imports of fish under a certain size. 
With a regulatory body like NOAA already in place to enforce such a ban, it could 
have an effect worldwide. Such a policy could be costly and would likely be met 
with uproar from exporting nations, but it is a potential solution that the United 
States has the capabilities to implement successfully. In general, the makeup of 
U.S. fishery regulation and enforcement bodies, and its past regulatory successes, 
indicate that the country could be effective in areas where intergovernmental 
Bluefin protection groups fail.  
 
C. The Japanese Market and Regulatory Bodies 
 
The Japanese Bluefin market is markedly different from the U.S. market. 
Although Japan has also cut down on its own commercial fishing, it consumes 
Bluefin meat in much greater quantities and is home to the largest fish market in 
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the world.86 Nearly every caught Bluefin tuna will, at some point, pass through 
Japan.87 This access to the fish puts Japan in a position to be able to regulate the 
trade, and the country seems to have the mechanisms in place to do so effectively.  
Bluefin were not popular in Japan until the 1960s;88 Yellowfin meat was much 
preferred before Japan’s export boom took place.89 Once Japan began sending its 
goods to the West in large quantities, airlines noticed they were losing money by 
sending back empty planes.90 One businessman had the idea to ship refrigerated 
Atlantic Bluefin to Japan from the West, and it quickly became favored by sushi 
chefs.91 
Japan’s per capita seafood consumption is among the highest in the 
industrialized world, and while the Japanese do not catch much Atlantic Bluefin 
anymore, they do eat almost all of it.92 Much of their Atlantic Bluefin is imported 
from the Mediterranean, where catching juveniles is frequent.93 The juvenile fish 
are taken to ranches, where they undergo the fattening process and never 
reproduce.94 These ranched fish are then almost exclusively sent to Japan, where 95 
percent of tuna will end up in sushi restaurants.95  
Nearly all of the fish imported into Japan go to the Tsukiji Fish Market in 
Tokyo.96 It is the largest fish market in the world,97 where city officials oversee 
auctions and wholesalers scout out fish for their customers. It is unlike any fish 
market in the United States. Intermediate wholesalers in the Tsukiji Fish Market 
have three jobs: skillfully evaluating the fish, skillfully breaking down the fish, and 
maintaining food safety.98 They have licenses to buy the fish at auction and orders 
to fill from customers who are mostly restaurant owners.99 The wholesalers bid 
based on what the customer requires and what they think the customer will be 
willing to pay.  
Problems in the quality of the auctioned fish arise frequently, and the merchants 
settle disputes in a “Tuna Court” created by the state.100 The court is fast and 
inexpensive and follows the normal rules and procedures of a government 
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ordinance.101 Conflicts that must be taken to court typically arise because a fish is 
diseased, blemished, or generally worth less than the buyer expected.102 Instead of 
using a “caveat emptor” model, merchants take 7000 claims each year to the Tuna 
Court and demand that their winning bid be reduced.103  
Such a court is simply not necessary in the United States, where the markets are 
much smaller and fewer purchases are disputed.104 In the rare occurrence that there 
is a conflict about a worse-than-expected fish, there is no formal dispute resolution 
mechanism.105 Tuna Courts are entirely unique to Japan.106  
Immediately after auction, buyers split open the fish to determine if the quality 
is as expected.107 If there is a dispute, it must be brought to the Tuna Court on the 
same day.108 Problems range from a fish being weighed incorrectly to being stored 
incorrectly. When there is a defect, buyers assert a right to compensation and go to 
the Tuna Court. The Court itself is only open in fifteen-minute increments, four 
times a day.109 Its jurisdiction comes from a 1972 Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
(TMG) ordinance; the TMG in turn has authority to pass such an ordinance from 
Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries.110 
The Court requires that sellers allow pre-auction inspection.111 Most of the 
buyers’ grievances, then, stem from essentially no-fault complaints: the buyer 
claims that there was a gap between his expectations and the actual quality of the 
purchase that resulted from defects that were virtually undiscoverable pre-
auction.112 Five judges, with no legal training, inspect the fish brought in for 
complaint.113 There is no formal hearing, and buyers do not give a reason for their 
claims.114 The judges then independently write down their assessments of the value 
of the fish and one of them compiles the judgments.115 This process typically takes 
anywhere between fifteen seconds and two minutes.116 A single remedy is offered 
to the buyers: the winning auction price is adjusted by an amount equal to 50 
percent of the damage.117 By ordinance, the judges’ scores are averaged to come up 
with this amount; instead of an exact calculation, the number is often ballparked.118  
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D. Suggested Improvements and Potential for Success in Japan 
 
Outside of the Tsukiji Fish Market, Japan has a mediocre track record for 
enforcing regulations on the Bluefin trade, despite having massive access to the 
fish. Japanese longliners were blamed for causing the stock of Atlantic Bluefin that 
congregated near Brazil to collapse, and similar complaints have been lodged 
against the Japanese for the overfishing of both Atlantic and Pacific Bluefin.119 
Recently, Japan has shown more of a willingness to pass regulations protecting 
Bluefin, and it remains to be seen whether those regulations will be enforced 
successfully.120 If it were inclined, though, Japan could have a massive impact on 
rebuilding Bluefin stocks. A size limit could likely be implemented more 
successfully in Tsukiji than in the United States; nearly all caught Bluefin pass 
through the market, the origins of the fish are easily traceable, and a court is 
already in place.121 A fine for entering small fish into the market could be placed on 
the importers, with the Tuna Court making the decisions on whether the fish is 
small and juvenile. Such a system would not require any legal training from the 
judges, and it is reasonable to think that it could work with the same speed and ease 
as the quality conflicts.122 Some of the fish imported from the Mediterranean are 
fattened in farms and would meet the size limit without having been able to 
reproduce; however, the large, wild-caught fish are the most valuable. This creates 
an incentive for fishermen to leave juveniles in the water. Such an incentive could 
have a large impact on stock recovery, and Japan already has the mechanisms in 
place to enforce it.  
 
III. GOVERNMENT WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT REGULATION 
 
While both countries could successfully enforce regulations that would help 
improve Bluefin stock worldwide, a major unanswered question is whether or not 
they actually would. The United States has a relatively good track record of 
backing strict Bluefin regulations and successfully implementing species-specific 
fishing regulations.123 Japan, however, is notorious for failing to support overfished 
species regulations;124 it has spoken out against Bluefin protection in the past and 
has very publicly avoided international guidelines for whale and dolphin 
hunting.125 While it is entirely possible that the United States might be willing to 
take on some responsibility for protecting Bluefin in areas where multinational 
organizations have failed, the same seems less likely, though not impossible, for 
Japan.  
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A. U.S. Attitudes Toward Bluefin and Other Species-Specific Regulation 
  
Although the United States has a history of overfishing certain species, it also 
tends to implement proper regulations to protect those species. For example, in the 
1980s, Americans overfished striped bass, a species native to North America.126 
Consumer pressure to protect the bass became political, and “draconian limits,” 
catch moratoria, and size requirements were imposed with little resistance and 
much success.127  
While the United States certainly contributes its share to overfishing, it does not 
tend to mount an opposition when experts say protections are needed.128 For 
Bluefin specifically, the United States has encouraged multinational bodies to pass 
stronger protections for years. In 2010, it backed the inclusion of Bluefin on the 
CITES list of non-traded species because ICCAT did not mandate a sufficiently 
low quota, according to assistant Interior Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks 
Tom Strickland.129 He has also criticized ICCAT for its inability to ensure 
compliance from member nations.130 In September 2013, Asia-Pacific fishing 
nations agreed to reduce catch amounts for Bluefin tuna aged three and younger by 
15 percent of the average catch amounts between 2002 and 2004.131 At that 
meeting, the United States had proposed and lobbied for a 25 percent decrease, but 
was later outvoted by Japan’s voting bloc.132  
Americans themselves also seem quite willing to comply with regulations on 
threatened fish; when NOAA Fisheries proposed lowering the recreational catch 
limit on Pacific Bluefin, it was met with little resistance from American sport 
fishermen.133 Even though actual catches were already lower than the catch limits 
in place and the idea that “the plight of the Pacific Bluefin is not of our making” 
was a prevailing attitude, fishermen showed a willingness to comply with the lower 
recreational quotas.134 Sustainable sushi restaurants are now popping up on the 
West coast, where sushi enthusiasts have started to demand more information about 
the fish used in their food.135  
In general, both the U.S. government and U.S. citizens have shown a historical 
willingness to implement and comply with species-specific fishing regulations when 
certain stocks are being overfished.136 It is reasonable to assume that the same 
consideration will be given to Bluefin in the future, especially in the wake of the 
stricter commercial Bluefin fishing requirements passed by NOAA in December of 
2014.137 The United States, then, likely has both the ability and the willingness to act 
in place of multinational governments in protecting Bluefin stocks.  
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B. Japanese Attitudes Toward Bluefin and Other Species-Specific Regulation 
 
Japan does not share America’s largely uneventful history of implementing 
species-specific fishing regulations. Instead, it is notorious worldwide for its 
aggressive fishing of threatened species, especially dolphins and whales.138  
Japan is a member of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which was 
set up in 1946 to protect cetaceans, including dolphins and whales, from 
overfishing.139 In 1982, whale stocks were so depleted that the IWC passed an 
international moratorium on the commercial fishing of all whale species.140 Despite 
this ban, activists have clashed with Japanese whalers as recently as 2013.141 
Exploiting a loophole in the IWC moratorium that allows nations to issue 
“scientific permits,” Japan hunts approximately 850 minke whales annually as part 
of a “research whaling” campaign and has killed nearly 14,000 whales for 
“research purposes” since the moratorium began.142 In spite of this, the IWC’s 
scientific community found that Japan’s research has yet to achieve any stated 
objectives.143  
Originally, it appeared that Japan’s incentive was to restart commercial whaling, 
an industry that used to be quite lucrative.144 A recent report that attempted to 
disprove the claim that whaling is a cultural and nutritional necessity for Japan, 
however, found that whale meat popularity was a postwar anomaly that Japan is 
simply trying to make profitable again.145 Demand for whale meat in Japan has 
been decreasing in recent years, especially among young people; 89 percent of 
Japanese citizens have not bought whale meat in the last year.146 Consumption of 
whale meat is at one percent of its peak in the 1960s.147 The government, however, 
still subsidizes its whaling fleet and its Institute of Cetacean Research and has 
diverted 2.28 billion yen148 from funds helping communities after the 2011 Miyagi 
Earthquake to support “research whaling, stabilization promotion and 
countermeasure expenses.”149 
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Between 2011 and 2012, the whaling industry attempted to boost income and 
reduce stockpiles by holding a series of whale meat auctions.150 Seventy-five 
percent of the meat went unsold, and schools are now being used to shift stockpiles 
of unsold whale meat.151 Despite this, the Japanese government has made no 
indication that it will back off anytime soon. It continues to provide the industry 
with generous loans and has stated that it intends to maintain its whaling fleet for 
the next decade.152 
The government’s attitude toward dolphin hunts is similar, despite international 
outcry about overfishing and inhumane practices. The IWC should be the body in 
charge of regulating dolphin hunting, but Japan has repeatedly blocked attempts to 
restrict its practices, claiming that the IWC doesn’t have the competency to deal 
with small cetaceans.153 Japan has been accused of paying bankrupt Caribbean 
nations to join the IWC and vote for the Japanese agenda.154 Moreover, the 
Japanese government has built multi-million dollar fishery complexes on every 
island in the Eastern Caribbean.155 Some Caribbean environmentalists have stated 
that the area is becoming a “neon-lit whorehouse” for the Japanese dolphin-hunting 
agenda.156  
Of particular concern is the annual dolphin hunt in Taiji, Japan, where 
thousands of dolphins are killed each year for their meat.157 Environmental groups 
that offered money to the local fishermen in Taiji to end their dolphin hunt were 
turned down because the fishermen conduct the hunt for “pest control.”158 The 
Japanese government posits that dolphins need to be killed because they are eating 
too many other fish, a statement that the British IWC delegation said was “hard to 
take seriously” and the Brazilian IWC delegation said amounts to “biological 
nonsense.”159 
Another reason offered by the government is that killing and eating dolphins is 
part of Japanese culture.160 In larger cities, however, consuming dolphin meat is 
unheard of because of its high mercury content.161 The meat is so undesirable that it 
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is often mislabeled as whale meat to be sold in Japanese markets.162  
Japan’s practices in whale and dolphin hunting seem to raise a single question: 
Why? Neither industry is particularly profitable, the meat itself is not in high 
demand, and the practices are a “persistent irritant”163 for Japan’s relations in 
international forums. The government does not even seem interested in putting 
forth believable explanations for its actions. Some scientists speculate that Japan is 
attempting to keep the whale and dolphin markets alive because it is concerned 
about running out of other fish.164 Atherton Martin, a former Dominican 
representative of the IWC, posited the theory that Japan’s actions are based on 
“misplaced national pride” that has to do with “remnants of a traditional notion of 
empire.”165 Essentially, he says that Japan’s whale and dolphin hunts are a reaction 
to being tired of the West demanding that Japan conform to certain standards. This 
is supported by the executive director of Greenpeace Japan’s belief that Japanese 
propaganda characterizes whaling as a “cultural conflict pitting Japan against 
outsiders.”166 
Regardless of the reasons why, it is almost undeniable that the Japanese 
government has shown a reluctance to pass its own species-specific fishing 
regulations. If the “traditional notion of empire” theory is correct, however, then 
Bluefin may still have a chance in Japan because of the relatively newfound 
popularity and high economic value of Bluefin. Tuna sushi did not exist in Japan 
until 1800; fish with red flesh were originally looked down upon because of how 
quickly they spoil, according to sushi historian Masuo Yoshino.167 The Japanese 
government does not seem to have made statements about Bluefin fishing and 
consumption being part of Japanese culture, and the fish may be sufficiently unlike 
dolphins and whales to solicit a different government reaction. Furthermore, 
Bluefin are far more profitable in Japan than the dolphin and whaling industries, 
giving both the government and the people a major incentive to ensure its survival.  
In September of 2014, Japan announced that it planned to halve its catch of 
Pacific Bluefin in 2015, with the intention of reducing catches of juveniles.168 
Some newspapers also reported that Japan thought previous cuts agreed to 
internationally were insufficient, and the government was encouraging other 
nations to adopt their own cuts.169 Although Japan’s history of species-specific 
regulation indicates that the country might be unwilling to make up for failures in 
intergovernmental Bluefin protection, it is also entirely possible that Bluefin have a 
unique market that the government would be willing to protect.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Despite totally different makeups, both the American and Japanese Bluefin 
markets have the mechanisms in place to allow the countries to successfully 
implement regulations on size and fishing methods. While the governments have 
taken completely opposite approaches to species-specific regulation in the past, it is 
still feasible that both will be willing to pass and enforce these regulations, as both 
have very recently changed their policies independent of any encouragement from 
multinational entities. Based on the size of the two countries’ markets, this bodes 
well for the future of Bluefin tuna.  
The governments themselves, however, cannot be relied on to fix this 
worldwide problem. The populations of the two countries will likely be called on in 
the future to contribute to the solution, as they have one thing in common: a 
seemingly insatiable appetite for Bluefin tuna. It is hardly a question that the 
populations of each country will be encouraged to eat more responsibly in the 
future. Whether the consumers, like their governments, will be able and willing to 
do so has yet to be determined.  
 
 
